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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
2	X	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	v.	17 CR 74 (CM)
5	IBRAHIM ISSA,	
6	Defendant.	SENTENCE
7	x	
8		New York, N.Y. June 20, 2019 11:35 a.m.
		11:33 d.m.
10	Before:	
11	HON. COLLEEN MCMAHON,	
12		Chief District Judge
13		
14	APPEARANCES	
15	GEOFFREY S. BERMAN,	
16	United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York ELIZABETH A. HANFT KYLE A. WIRSHBA NOAH D. SOLOWIEJCZYK Assistant United States Attorneys BENJAMIN BRAFMAN JOSHUA D. KIRSHNER STUART GOLD	
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21	Attorneys for Defendant	
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23	ALSO PRESENT: Special Agent Anthony Dubar, Inspector General Special Agent Grace Soto, IRS	
24	Paralegal Specialist Co	liteen Geler, USAO
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(Case called) 1 MS. HANFT: Good morning, your Honor. 2 3 Elizabeth Hanft, for the government. Joined here at counsel table by my colleagues Kyle 4 5 Wirshba and Noah Solowiejczyk; and Special Agent Anthony Dubar, 6 and Special Agent Grace Soto; and Paralegal Specialist Colleen 7 Geier, from the U.S. Attorney's office. THE COURT: Good morning. 8 9 MS. HANFT: Good morning. 10 MR. BRAFMAN: Good morning, your Honor. 11 Benjamin Brafman, joined by Mr. Joshua Kirshner and 12 Stuart Gold. And Mr. Issa is present and ready for sentencing. 13 THE COURT: Good morning. Have a seat, everyone. 14 This matter is on for sentencing under Docket No. 17 CR 74, United States of America v. Ibrahim Issa, Mr. Issa 15 having been found quilty by a jury of 12 of: 16 17 One count of bribing a public official, a Class C felony, in violation of 18, United States Code, Section 201 18 This crime carries a statutory maximum penalty of 19 (b) (1) (A). 20 15 years' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, a fine 21 of \$250,000, and a \$100 special assessment. 22 One count of conspiracy to evade or defeat income tax, 23 a Class D felony, in violation of 18, United States Code,

Section 371. This crime carries a statutory maximum penalty of

five years' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, a

\$250,000 fine, and a \$100 special assessment.

One count of tax evasion, a Class D felony, in violation of 26, United States Code, Section 7201, which carries a statutory maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, a fine of \$100,000, and a \$100 special assessment.

One count of aiding and assisting in the preparation and presentation of a false corporate income tax return, Class E felony, in violation of 26, United States Code, Section 7206. This crime carries a statutory maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment, one year supervised release, a fine of up to \$100,000, and a \$100 special assessment.

Three counts of subscribing to false individual tax returns for the tax years 2012, '13, and '14, Class E felonies, in violation of 26, United States Code, Section 7206, each carrying a statutory maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment, one year of supervised release, a fine of up to \$100,000, and a \$100 special assessment.

In connection with today's proceedings, I have received and reviewed the presentence investigation report prepared by United States Probation Officer Specialist Colleen Tyler, filed with the Court on April 9, 2019. I have a sentencing memorandum from the government filed on June 13, 2019. I have a substantial number of submissions from Mr. Brafman. I have the original sentencing memorandum with a

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massive, massive appendix containing a number of letters in support of Mr. Issa. I have a second letter that was filed by Mr. Brafman on June 6, 2019, and a third letter filed in response to the government's sentencing memorandum which was received yesterday on June 19, 2019.

Is there anything else I should have seen in writing prior to today's proceedings from the government?

MS. HANFT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: From the defendant?

MR. BRAFMAN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Has the government reviewed the presentence report?

MS. HANFT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any additions, deletions, or corrections that you wish to make?

MS. HANFT: Just two items, your Honor.

In paragraph 19, which is on page 8, I believe this was an error, as the PSR in later paragraphs describes the obstruction enhancement. But, of course --

THE COURT: Well, paragraph 19 needs to be stricken.

But I'll just tell you right off the bat, this is like no secret, probation hasn't recommended a guideline sentence; the government doesn't appear to be seeking a guideline sentence; and I'm not planning to impose a guideline sentence.

So rather than getting involved in do we have to have

a Fatico hearing on obstruction, I'm just going to throw those two points out, okay? Instead of 151 to 181 months, it's going to be 121 to 151 months. I want you to know, I've now considered the guideline, okay? And I'm not going to follow it. And I'm not going to sentence proportionately to the guidelines, so it doesn't really make any difference whether I keep those two points in or not, Ms. Hanft.

MS. HANFT: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: I get your position. I don't want to have a hearing about it. It's irrelevant.

MS. HANFT: Understood, your Honor.

If the Court doesn't find obstruction, however, the guidelines aren't 121 to 151. Our position is with the obstruction enhancement they are 121 to 151.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. I don't understand that.

I've got 151 to 181 from probation.

MS. HANFT: Correct, your Honor.

As noted in our sentencing submission, though, defense counsel came back to the government with certain costs that we then agreed to deduct --

THE COURT: Oh, you mean that hadn't been factored in by probation?

MS. HANFT: That had not, your Honor.

So just for the record, our view of the guidelines is that they are 121 to 151 months.

THE COURT: And without the two points for --1 Without two points for obstruction, it 2 MS. HANFT: 3 would be two levels lower, so it would be 97 to 121. 97 to 121. Fine. 4 THE COURT: 5 MS. HANFT: And then the only other item, just to 6 correct in the PSR, your Honor, is paragraph 105. It says that 7 the guidelines' fine range is 35,000 to 250,000. That should be 350,000. Because even though the statutory maximum on one 8 9 of the counts is 250,000, there are, of course, several counts 10 of conviction in this case. 11 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hanft. 12 Now, with that said and having heard my ruling on the 13 obstruction, does the government wish to be heard on 14 sentencing? 15 Yes, your Honor. MS. HANFT: Somehow I knew you did. 16 THE COURT: 17 MS. HANFT: So I am understanding that the Court does 18 not want to hear testimony from a witness, is that correct, 19 regarding obstruction? 20 THE COURT: Regarding obstruction, I absolutely don't. 21 I'm simply not going to. I don't need to jump down that rabbit 22 hole. 23 MS. HANFT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 24 As the Court knows, after sitting through 25 approximately two weeks of trial in this case, Mr. Issa

brazenly bribed postal VMF employees. He showered them with meals and gifts -- cash, in the case of Mr. Velez -- vacations. And the Court heard recording after recording it being demonstrated that Mr. Issa did not believe that the rules applied to him; he believed that he could cheat the system to get work and to avoid paying taxes.

In addition, Mr. Issa tried to conceal his bribes. He told multiple VMF managers to keep things quiet. He told Ismael Velez not to deposit the cash Issa was giving him into bank accounts. He told Jeffrey Blight to pay for his trip to New York on his own credit cards, and that Issa would pay him back in person so that there would be no records of it. He handed Mr. Blight \$2,000 in cash under the table at a restaurant in Chinatown.

So this is the conduct of a serial cheater and not a momentary aberration, as defense counsel's submission suggests.

As to the history and characteristics of Mr. Issa, despite the numerous talents that the letters he has submitted extol, he committed these crimes. He didn't play by the rules and he didn't support his employees. I would note that Mr. Issa's employees, many of them have submitted letters on his behalf.

But, in fact, as the Court also heard at trial,

Mr. Issa implicated his own employees in his crimes. Your

Honor will remember the testimony of Sohail Butt, who Issa had

deliver cash payments to Velez or Claudia Betancourt, who was instructed to change the categorization of certain expenses for tax purposes. These are selfish acts; they are not the acts of the savior employer who always has his employees' best interests at heart that the defendant submission touts.

So for these reasons, the nature and circumstances of the offense, Mr. Issa's history and characteristics, the need for deterrence, and for all the reasons stated in our sentencing submission, the government respectfully submits that a guidelines — that a sentence within the range recommended by probation of approximately 60 months or a sentence in or around that, and a fine within the applicable guidelines range here, are sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes of sentencing.

Unless the Court has any questions, we'll rest on our submissions.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Ms. Hanft.

Mr. Brafman, have you -- Ms. Hanft, let me just ask a question. I take it it's the government's position that paragraph 25 of the presentence report should be reduced from 18 to 16, is that where I make the correction?

MS. HANFT: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Bringing the total offense level to 30.

Okay. Mr. Brafman, have you reviewed the presentence

report and have you gone over it with Mr. Issa?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Obviously I've made two changes to the guideline calculation; one at the behest of the government, and one at my own or at the behest of you. Is there anything else that you think I need to change or amend in the presentence report?

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, I've listened carefully to what the Court said about where you see the guideline play into these facts. I don't want to belabor it, but in our submission we have suggested that Mr. Issa should be given credit under the costs far more than the government --

THE COURT: For a larger amount. But I'm with the government on this.

MR. BRAFMAN: Okay. Then I won't belabor the issue; I think we've preserved the issue.

THE COURT: You've preserved it. You've definitely preserved it.

MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, respectfully, I'm obviously not going to repeat the substance of our submission; I know your Honor has read it. I've had other sentences before this Court, and I know your Honor is meticulous in reading all of the letters.

And I think the letters in this case are rather compelling in many ways.

And, you know, Judge, I've tried to figure out how many times I've stood in the well of a federal court on sentence, and I can't do it exactly, but it's north of 500 times.

THE COURT: I'll bet.

MR. BRAFMAN: And I will tell you, Judge, with great respect, that this is the second time in more than 40 years where I am pleased that despite his conviction, that a defendant actually proceeded to trial. And I think the sentence that I hope your Honor will impose, after having sat through this trial, I think would be lower, indeed, than perhaps the sentence that the defendant would get had he pled guilty.

Because I think one of the things this trial did, besides obviously demonstrating the criminal culpability, is I would hope that it in some ways humanized the defendant; and that the Court has an appreciation of really who this man is beyond the facts that get him to be convicted.

So I've sort of dreaded this day for a long time, because, as I say in my letter, we've gotten to know Mr. Issa over the past two years, despite the criminal conduct, which I obviously do not condone. I find him to be an extraordinary individual in many ways. He is obviously talented; he has great entrepreneurial skills; and, having come with nothing, he has built a fairly successful business model.

And I want to point out that which the government, I think, in their submission ignores: There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Issa obtained the contracts from the postal service based on fraud or criminality. He spent years negotiating contracts which he ended up getting. And what was ironic, as I point out in the letter, is having gotten the contract, to be able to do the service at Mr. Nicholson's maintenance facility, it wasn't until the trial when Mr. Nicholson became aware of the fact that Mr. Issa had actually been awarded the contract from Philadelphia Postal Service to do the repair work at Mr. Nicholson's own repair facility.

I also note that which I think the trial demonstrated beyond question, is that the post office, if you will, was overwhelmed with the need for repair work, they were overwhelmed with the need for important repair work on a -- not on a schedule basis, but needing it within 24 hours at times, overnight, so that the trucks would not be taken out of service and be able to deliver the mail.

And as I got into the facts of this case and tried to start to understand the nature of the business, I was struck by a couple of things, which I don't think the government refers to at all, but which I hope your Honor focused on at least a bit during the trial.

Doing what he did -- forget the meals for a minute and

forget the Blight bribe, which I know is why we are here today — building these facilities in Dearborn, Michigan, building these facilities in Long Island and then Upstate New York, took an extraordinary amount of investment, time, and effort and somewhat genius, if you will, to get them up and running, to find the mechanics, train them, and let them service these cars. And we have a decrepit vehicle — decrepit fleet of vehicles that are 25, 30 years old, breaking down constantly.

And, you know, there were suggestions, Well, the work was shoddy. We didn't see any evidence of shoddy work. We saw evidence of bill after bill after bill of work that was actually performed, sometimes overnight.

And while Mr. Nicholson said that, Oh, I didn't authorize this repair of a horn on this \$3300 bill on the truck, the supervisors who ran these facilities were all listed on the pieces of paper. And obviously that was the count that Mr. Issa was acquitted of. And I think it's an important acquittal.

Because what happens in a criminal case is you're driven by, What did he do? He's not a public official himself. In many of the corruption cases that we refer to in our sentence parody part of our memo are cases involving corrupt officials who corrupted themselves and sought to sell out the people they represented.

If anything, the evidence in this case demonstrated that Mr. Issa, while somewhat flawed, obviously, which is why we're here, is nevertheless a businessman who was doing, I think, an important job. And when I look at the evidence in this case — and I put Velez on the side for a minute and I'll talk about that for a minute.

With respect to Mr. Nicholson, there's a part on one of the conversations where they are in a restaurant and he's wining and dining Mr. Nicholson, and there's lavish meals that they are eating. There's a reference by Mr. Issa, he says, Do you see all of those tables around us? Those are all businesspeople buying dinner for other businesspeople. And that was a mindset that Mr. Issa had, that this was somewhat business.

Now, it was illegal, and he's standing here, and I think your Honor will ultimately sentence him, because it's considered a serious crime and I understand that. But I want to place things in context.

With Mr. Nicholson, yes, there were lavish gifts and there was wine and there was dinner. There was never any money; there was never any cash. Yes, he got a gift at one point which was an iPad that was given out by Mr. Issa's company as a novelty.

The case of Blight -- and I don't want to revisit the trial, but your Honor heard the tedious and, at times,

repetitive nature of the cross-examination of Blight, because it's weeks and weeks and weeks of begging Mr. Issa for money and lying to him about all of his financial hardship.

And one of the things you see from the letters that have been presented to the Court -- and I'm going to refer to just the quality of some of the letters in a minute -- I'm sure your Honor has seen more than I have, but I've seen tens of thousands of letters submitted on behalf of people about to be sentenced. And there are family letters, and there are friend letters, and there are letters that say he's a good community person, and there are letters that generally say that the person works for a charity, gives money to a charity.

I haven't seen a lot of letters like some of the letters in this case; letters from an employee named Mr. Rivera who was a drug offender and repeatedly, you know, fell back into the throes of addiction. And Mr. Issa gave him a job again and again and again and again, and made sure that he sobered up and went for rehab, and paid him while he was in rehab. That speaks volumes about, I think, the man you're about to sentence; not the crime you're about to sentence, but the man you're about to sentence.

And the letter that we submitted yesterday with my letter, which is Exhibit 6, I submitted it again because as I read these letters again preparing for sentence for the second time after I read them when we first got them, I was struck by

the letter that we submitted yesterday only because it encapsulates the whole Detroit issue with respect to Mr. Issa building a business, A, in a depressed area that no one else would go into; B, he built a state-of-the-art facility; three, he hired people from this depressed area who needed jobs and paid them well. He trained them.

And the letter also indicates that when there would be these employer pep talks, when Mr. Issa would come in and there were 48 people who he would gather around, he said to them, What you suffer from is learned helplessness. You think you're in a bad spot, you don't think you're ever going to get out of the bad spot, so you're helpless. And he taught them not to be helpless. He gave them a job.

And one of the things I ask your Honor to consider when deciding how long to sentence Mr. Issa to prison, if you're going to impose a prison sentence, is a lot of people depend on him. Forget the family for a minute. There are employees out there today who are somewhat unemployable in today's economy. These people rely on him for their jobs. He gave jobs to unemployed single mothers who were abandoned by their husbands or boyfriends, who had young children. They needed jobs, he gave them jobs; they needed time off for childcare, he gave them time off. He was a good man to these people. He did not corrupt his employees.

I understand that, yes, Mr. Sohail handed envelopes to

Mr. Velez. He had no idea he was bribing Velez, as he testified to here. They didn't involve him in criminal conduct. The people who worked in these gas stations, the people who worked in these repair facilities, one after another talk about the fact that they had a criminal record. Mr. Issa hired them. He believed in giving people a second chance, which is an interesting coin or phrase, term or phrase, when I'm asking for a very lenient sentence on behalf of someone who's obviously violated the law.

So let me tell you, with great respect, where I am here.

I spoke this week at an alternative sentencing symposium at Columbia University, sponsored by The Olive Society. And what they do is they formulate alternative -THE COURT: I know. Unfortunately, I could not

MR. BRAFMAN: But I spoke there and I read the literature. And I was, to be honest with you, intrigued.

attend; I was otherwise engaged.

We tried to formulate something to submit to the Court; and we reached out to people who are in a position to help train. And their position uniformly is, We can't do this in a vacuum; or we can't say, We're going to do this three years from now or two years from now or after he finishes his sentence. If you come to me and you say, Here's the sentence. We'll prepare a proposal. And we'll prepare a proposal which

will allow Mr. Issa to perhaps train people who are involved in drug treatment programs, or we will give Mr. Issa access through The Fortune Society to people who come out of jail and need employment.

So to the extent that once we know what the sentence is, could we formulate a plan with these people? I think the answer is yes.

So here is the choice your Honor makes. I've read the government's submission. And to be honest with you, I was struck by one comment in the submission on page 15 where they refer to our letters. And they say while — they talk about him being generous and devoted. And they say, This is a trait to be commended in theory. It's not a theory, it's a fact. It's not an argument, it's a fact. He's a generous employer. He's a kind employer. He's an important employer in an industry where basically most of the people who work there are blue-collar people. So we could either warehouse him for a significant period of time or a not significant period of time.

So I just want to touch upon two items which I think we all should be focused on.

Under 3553, which, thank God, I've lived long enough to appear before judges when the guidelines were no longer mandatory, and you can be a judge and I can be an advocate, we don't have to pigeonhole people. And some of the cases cited by the government are extraordinary family circumstances cases

which we don't need to go into here. We're not arguing extraordinary family circumstances and we don't need to ask for a downward departure. We need to ask for a variance. And I think we're all on the same page that there's going to be a variance, the only question is how much is a variance.

So here are my arguments briefly, your Honor, on 3553:

It's clear that Mr. Issa is an intelligent man, and it's clear that he's not going to benefit when incarcerated by training or educational programs or anything that the Bureau of Prisons has to offer. He doesn't need medical treatment that the Bureau of Prisons has to offer. In terms of counseling that the Bureau of Prisons — God help us — even if they have that to offer, that's not what we're talking about.

So what we're talking about is is he a danger to the community? And I suggest that he's not. There's no argument from the government that society has to be protected from Mr. Issa.

Is he going to be a recidivist? And the information we provided to your Honor, which the government, I don't think, has focused on at all, is as people get older, the likelihood of recidivism is substantially reduced. And with someone in Mr. Issa's range of being 57 years old, it's almost *de minimis*. And a number of courts in this building have written on this, and they've also cited to studies, and we've provided that information to your Honor. So I don't think you ever have to

be concerned that you'll see Mr. Issa again in a criminal case in this building or in any other courtroom.

This has been a devastating event in his life; it has cost him everything; it has cost him his businesses; it has humiliated him; and, as you see from the letters submitted by family members, he has a very proud family that he is part of, from parents that are elderly and not well, to nieces and nephews, some stricken with cancer, who write about Mr. Issa as the primary person in the family.

And I cite one letter that I didn't staple to my letter. There's a letter from a concierge who works in the building that Mr. Issa lives in. And the man writes to the fact that Mr. Issa saw him eating a sandwich on his dinner break and said, That's not dinner. Come up to my apartment and I will make dinner for you. And Mr. Issa cooked him dinner. It's a simple gesture; but yet it speaks volumes of what we're dealing with. Are we dealing with a bad man or are we dealing with a good man who has done something bad? So in terms of personal deterrence, Judge, I don't think you need to worry about that at all.

So then we come to the question of general deterrence. And is Mr. Issa to be punished in part for the crime, but also to send a message to somebody else. And the literature we have provided to the Court suggests that in a white-collar case, any prison sentence is significant deterrence to people who would

not normally want to go to prison, even for a day, much less for a year and a day or two years or more.

So the issue of general deterrence has always intrigued me. And about 30 years ago in the well of a courtroom in the Eastern District, there was an argument by an assistant to a judge. And I'm not certain it's appropriate for me to name the judge, but it's a judge I have enormous respect for and is still on the bench and has been there for 40 years.

The judge looked at the assistant and, in substance, said, You're asking me to send this man to prison for X number of years so that someone else who you haven't identified, who we don't know, may one day think before they commit a crime that, Tony Issa got this much for that crime, therefore, I'm not going to do that crime.

The judge basically says, I don't accept that as a premise.

I understand the premise of general deterrence. All I'm suggesting to you, your Honor, is that at the end of the day, he's not a public official; at the end of the day, I understand his crimes are serious and we're not defending the crime. The jury has spoken. But I'm asking you to consider, with great respect, where he should be sentenced. And the government says 60 months. And there's no rationale --

THE COURT: Probation says 60 months.

MR. BRAFMAN: But then the government says 60 months.

THE COURT: The government says -- okay.

MR. BRAFMAN: The government said 60 months. They say about 60 months, all right.

Judge, this is sort of a made-up number. It has no relationship to the guidelines. And I commend probation for recognizing that the guidelines sentences are draconian; and I commend the government for not standing up, as is often the case, and saying, We, you know, think there should be a guideline sentence.

But 60 months that's being spoken of, that's not magic. There's no mathematical determination how that was arrived at. It's sort of like an arbitrary number. And the only person who will suffer if the Court imposes a higher sentence than is necessary is not anybody outside of the well of this courtroom, it's Mr. Issa, his family, and his employees.

So here is my question: We have given the Court a graph. And I know we've done some artful calculations with how probation originally thought it was a level 34, they recommended 60 months; now it's a level 32, which is a -- we ask for a 20 percent reduction from that.

THE COURT: But I don't do percentage reductions.

MR. BRAFMAN: I know that.

THE COURT: I have to tell you, I just want this to be really clear, because I know you're going to take an appeal

from the conviction. And I want the Second Circuit to understand that if I calculate the guidelines wrong, I am not going to derive Mr. Issa's sentence as a percentage of the guidelines.

MR. BRAFMAN: Good.

THE COURT: So if I get it wrong, they shouldn't remand it to me, because I would give him the same sentence, whether the guidelines were 151 to 181, 121 to 151, or 97 to 121. I want that to be more. As you say, they should be even lower than that. I just want that to be really, really clear.

MR. BRAFMAN: It is clear. It is crystal clear to us. And I wanted to be crystal clear on the record, I hear you loud and clear.

So the answer is --

THE COURT: You, of course, are not the person I'm talking to, but --

MR. BRAFMAN: I got it, Judge. I'm fast on the uptake.

THE COURT: I know you are, Mr. Brafman.

MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you.

And I actually have framed that piece of transcript from the trial that I told you I would frame.

All right. Judge, getting back to where we should sentence -- obviously, you have such wide discretion here; it's sort of like -- to me it's an awesome power that is imposed by

your Honor. And I respect that. And I ask you to consider a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote respect for the law. And we have suggested in this case that the Court should be in the 29-month range. That's a significant sentence for someone who's never been in prison before. It's years. It's years of being without your family, of being in a humiliating, condescending position where you're told when you can eat and sleep. People who've never been to a prison and people who've never been in a room with people in prison maybe don't get it. I know your Honor gets it because you sentence a lot of people. I get it.

And I can tell you, Judge, that in the case of Mr. Issa, if you were to sentence him below 60 months -- and I submit substantially below 60 months -- I think you would be doing something good, not something bad, and not something inappropriate. I think he's a good man. I think he has earned through his life consideration of who he is by the Court. And I ask your Honor to sentence the man and not the crime.

I have nothing else to say, unless your Honor has specific questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman, as always, I thank you very much.

MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Hanft, does the government wish to respond?

MS. HANFT: Your Honor, I would take issue with many of the things --

THE COURT: Much of what Mr. Brafman has said, I understand that. But do you want to respond?

MS. HANFT: I'm not going to go into details; I know the Court would prefer I not do that.

But I do want to point out that Mr. Brafman has entirely ignored the tax offenses. He's repeatedly referred to the offense here, the conduct here, and has repeatedly, sort of, attacked the conviction on the bribery count.

I would point out that Mr. Issa was convicted of a number of tax fraud counts which further shows his flagrant conduct, his flagrant violations of the law over a period of time, and again detracts from the argument that he is a generous person who freely gives money to those in need.

Certainly it is commendable -- and we have said in our sentencing submission that Mr. Brafman has pointed out, that it's commendable in theory. And we've said "in theory" because in this case, he's giving money to other people that is stolen money. And that certainly detracts from the generosity they extol. And that's all we intended to say in that portion of our sentencing submission. And it is certainly relevant to the Court's decision as to what sentence is appropriate to impose.

Other than that, unless the Court has questions, I'll sit down.

1 MR. BRAFMAN: Can I briefly respond, Judge?
2 Very briefly.

THE COURT: Then I'll have to let them do it again.

Mr. Brafman, go right ahead.

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, I didn't discuss the tax charges because, as you know and as everyone here knows, the sentence that you impose on the bribery count will be enough to cover the tax count if your Honor sentences concurrently.

But let me tell you, your Honor, respectfully, what we said in our letter. And I'm glad Ms. Hanft raised this because, you know, I want to just stress one thing.

The evidence in this case showed that Mr. Issa was kind of reckless in how he proceeded in terms of his taxes.

THE COURT: Kind of reckless?

MR. BRAFMAN: But let me just say something.

The evidence in this case shows that the way the IRS contacted him was to suggest that he needs to refile, and then they were going to conduct an audit. Two years later, on the eve of this trial, when Mr. Issa did not plead, they added the tax counts. They had these tax counts for six years. They added it on the eve of trial when he decided to go to trial.

And I submit with great respect if he had pled guilty a year before the trial, he would have pled guilty to the bribery -- maybe to only the bribery, because he always denied stealing from the government -- and the tax counts would have

been handled in civil fashion. And you don't have to be inside the IRS to understand that, and I'm not violating Rule 11.

But the timing of the indictment of the tax counts, having had it for five years, suggests to me that this is not a tax case. He will have to deal with the tax issues. There is a restitution on the tax issues; he will have to pay the taxes when he comes out, and he will have to refile and amend and file new taxes. And he has gone through a ten-year divorce where much of the stuff involving his taxes was difficult for him to deal with.

So, yes, he violated the tax laws. But I think this is a bribery case. And I ask the Court to sentence Mr. Issa one time and let everything else run concurrent.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Ms. Hanft.

MS. HANFT: I won't belabor the --

THE COURT: Or Mr. Wirshba, he's the tax guy.

MR. WIRSHBA: No, your Honor, nothing in response to the timing of the tax counts.

THE COURT: Mr. Issa, is there anything that you want to say?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry? Me?

THE COURT: Yes, sir, you.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak.

I just want to say that I'm embarrassed to be here today, so much so that I asked my family to stay home and not even to come.

I know I did some wrong things; and I'm ready to accept whatever sentencing your Honor finds appropriate. I just hope that you just take into consideration my whole life and not just the conduct of this conviction.

Thank you, your Honor.

I think I've already gotten out of the way the notion of the guidelines. This is, to me, not a guidelines driven case.

There are numerous reasons, having considered the guidelines — which I now calculate at 97 to 121 months. There are numerous reasons for me to conclude, notwithstanding what I saw and heard at the trial, that eight to ten years' imprisonment is probably not the right range for a 57-year-old defendant who, despite the fact that his crimes took place over a period of time such that one count on the bribery really encompassed a number of encounters — we're not talking about an individual instance of walking into a bank — and whose tax convictions stand three years, which does matter to me, I still don't think that eight to ten years is the appropriate sentencing range.

I'm very happy that we're no longer in the days when the guidelines are a straitjacket or a handcuff; also because that does allow me to be a judge and to think long and hard

about what the right sentence would be for the individual who's in front of me. And I'm actually not somebody who in my head penalizes someone for going to trial. It might be because I was never a prosecutor, I don't know, but I don't, as a rule, think to myself, All right. This guy went to trial, so we're going to — I know the guidelines, but we're going to punish him for electing to stand on his constitutional rights. So that doesn't play into my thinking at all. I want to be very clear about that. It does not play into my thinking about Mr. Issa at all.

But I operate from the premise that there is neither a magical nor a mathematical way to fashion a sentence in almost any case, but certainly not in a case like this. The guidelines are themselves driven by the Sentencing Commission's mathematical ideas of how the fraud should be valued. I've never much agreed with the Sentencing Commission's fraud guidelines.

I don't think there is anything either magical or mathematical about sentencing. I think that, in the end, it's a gut reaction from a judge about given everything I know about this person and this crime, these crimes — there are seven of them here — what is an appropriate sentence. And the always, always most important consideration for me is to punish for these crimes.

Mr. Brafman wants me to sentence the man and not the

crime. Well, if I'm to sentence the man and not the crime, then we certainly can't set aside everything I learned about the man at the trial. And the trial did not really redound to Mr. Issa's benefit.

In terms of what I learned about Mr. Issa, let me start with the tax counts, okay. I don't care when they were indicted. I try very hard and in my family we try very hard to pay our taxes. And tax crimes have always kind of bothered me, rank with me. It's like you want the benefits of living in this country and you're not willing to pay your share. And the burden then falls disproportionately on the rest of us. So you could even say that everybody else in this courtroom is a victim of the tax crime. And I take them very seriously.

And the evidence in this case about the tax evasion, the hiring and firing, the misleading of outside accountants, the complaining to Mr. Issa's wife about how the fact that the accountant was trying to do the right thing was not helping them because it was causing them to owe taxes and that wasn't the goal, I'm sort of reminded of another case that I had a long time ago when I had a defendant whose spiritual advisor was in the courtroom and, at the end of the trial day, I allowed a conference.

And I heard later that the defendant asked for a blessing; and that the spiritual advisor said, May justice be done.

The defendant said, Not that blessing. I want the let-me-go-home blessing.

And the tax evidence was so damning and, frankly, so revelatory about who Mr. Issa was as a human being, as a man, as a citizen; maybe not as an employer, maybe not as a husband or as a father, maybe not as a friend, but as a man, it was very revelatory. And it was not to Mr. Issa's benefit that I heard the things that he said and did during the three years when he was engaged in the process of not paying his taxes.

I have to agree with Mr. Brafman, this is principally a bribery case, even though there's only one count of conviction on bribery and six counts of conviction on tax. But I must tell you, I saw much the same kind of behavior perpetrated by Mr. Issa in connection with his dealings with Mr. Velez and the other people who work for the postal service.

The rules are the rules. And we have rules when we're dealing with the public sector that don't exist when a business transaction is purely in the private sector because we want to hold our public officials and the people who do business with them to a particularly high standard.

And Mr. Issa's wooing of individuals associated with the postal service for the purpose of getting business is what the jury found was unsavory. His dealings with those people were unsavory. "Unsavory" is an adjective that I think describes the man, the man I met and got to know during the

trial. He's an unsavory businessman.

So Mr. Brafman is correct, Mr. Issa is not a public official; the people who testified against him were the public officials. And I think Mr. Brafman guessed correctly that for that reason, I don't see a lot of guidance in the Sheldon Silver case or the Norman Seabrook case or the cases that involve real public officials or, in Seabrook's case, a real public union boss, who are the defendants. I think those cases might provide some guidance, assuming I agreed with the sentences that were handed down in those cases, if Mr. Issa were a public official. He's not. So I don't take much from those cases.

But you've already intuited that I'm not going to sentence him in the range of most of those sentences, which were in the 80-month, 90-month, 100-month range. I'm going to sentence him to less than that. And I'm going to do it to punish him for what he did, and I'm going to do it to punish him for how he did it, which is to say the man.

I want to say one more thing, which is that I'm well aware of the statistics about older offenders being less likely to recidivate. I think there are a lot of reasons for that.

One of them is age, one of them -- I'm going to guess is that many of the older offenders I see are people like Mr. Issa who have gained a certain stature in the community, they have education, they have businesses, they tend not to be poor kids

from the 'hood who have never had a break and have been selling drugs since they were 12 years old.

So I'm aware of that.

And that's one of the reasons why I think the guidelines sentence, whatever it may be — and we're going with 97 to 121 — is too much. But that doesn't mean that I think that probation's recommendation is too much. Probation's recommendation is the number I came to independently before I looked at probation's recommendation based on what I knew of the crimes and what I knew of the man. It's a not insignificant sentence. It will certainly send a message to Mr. Issa. It may or may not send a message to anybody in the community. I tend to agree that the community doesn't pay much attention to the sentences of people like Mr. Issa, certainly not as much as they pay to people like, say, Mr. Silver.

But Mr. Issa needs to be punished for what he did.

And it seems to me that a 60-month sentence on the bribery count cuts him a substantial break from the guidelines, which is not being calculated in percentage terms. And it is not greater than necessary to account for what I believe is the seriousness of this offense — these offenses, I will say these offenses. And I really have given it a lot of thought. I've read the letters.

As in so many white-collar cases, it is clear that Mr. Issa was one thing in his dealings with the postal service

and another thing altogether in his dealings with many of the other people with whom he has come into contact in his life.

And that disconnect, which I see all the time and which I know the government has, and I'm sure Mr. Brafman sees all the time, makes it incredibly difficult for somebody like me to understand why Mr. Issa would do what he did. But in the end, the fact that Mr. Issa has a Janus-faced personality does not excuse what he did. And I still think that what he did should drive the punishment.

So I've reviewed the presentence report. I accept and adopt as my findings the description of the offense and the offense conduct. We're changing the guidelines calculation, paragraph 25 -- first of all, paragraph 19 is simply being eliminated. Paragraph 25, the number 18 should be changed to 16. And I think that's because the value of the benefit received is 1.5 -- greater than 1.5 million, but less than 3.5 million I think is the right number. But it's a two-point reduction there.

Paragraph 28, I'm eliminating the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. And I'm quite honest about the reason I'm doing it; there's really no need to go through that exercise, since I've concluded that a guidelines sentence would be inappropriate in this case even without it. So there's no point in deciding whether it should be added to the guidelines. So we're going to get rid of that two points.

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And that means that paragraphs 29 and 32 should be amended by changing the number 34 to the number 30. There are corresponding changes that need to be made at the back end of the presentence report.

The guidelines number, at a total offense level of 30 and a Criminal History Category of I -- and that's correct -- is 97 to 121 months.

I also accept and adopt as my findings the description of Mr. Issa's offender characteristics, which are set forth starting at paragraph 40 of the presentence report.

Do you happen to have those numbers, Ms. Hanft? Is it 1.5 to 3.5?

MS. HANFT: As to the value the defendant received?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HANFT: Yes, that's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

 $\mbox{MS. HANFT:}$ With certain reduction for certain costs supplied by --

THE COURT: Okay. Yes. Thank you very much.

For the reasons I've already articulated, I am not imposing a guideline sentence; I am imposing a variance sentence. The Court of Appeals should be aware that I have considered the guidelines.

Okay. Mr. Issa, will you please stand.

Under Docket 17 CR 74, total offense level is 30,

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Criminal History Category I, I hereby sentence you, Ibrahim Issa, to be remanded to the custody of the attorney of the United States and the Bureau of Prisons on Count One for a term of 60 months; and on each of Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight, a term of 36 months, all to run concurrently. I further sentence you to a term of supervised release, upon your release from prison, of three years on each of Counts One, Three, and Four, and one year on Counts Five, Six, Seven, and Eight, to run concurrently. You are going to be required to make restitution, but I don't have a number yet, and that's to the government. Do you have paperwork on that yet, Ms. Hanft? We can submit an order --MS. HANFT: THE COURT: I know you'll have it in 90 days; you get 90 days to do it, but --We have the number now. MS. HANFT:

THE COURT: The number. Good. I'd like to articulate the number on the record.

MS. HANFT: It's \$557,176. And that's at page 18 of the government's sentencing submission.

THE COURT: Okay.

Required to make restitution to the United States in the amount of \$557,176; and to pay \$700 in a special assessment, which is due and payable immediately.

Mr. Issa, I recognize that a fine is recommended by

probation, but, frankly, Mr. Issa has a rather substantial tax obligation that's due and owing to the United States, and I really don't see the purpose of imposing a fine on top of that. And so I'm not going to impose the fine.

Mr. Brafman, what recommendations, if any, would you like me to make?

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, we would ask that the Court recommend that Mr. Issa be permitted to serve his sentence in Canaan, C-A-N-A-A-N. It's a camp facility in Pennsylvania. And we would also ask that he be permitted to voluntarily surrender to that facility on September 5th.

THE COURT: I will suggest Canaan. Mr. Issa, it seems to me, belongs in a very low-security type of facility. I think he would be a good candidate for camp. And so we'll make that clear. If Canaan is unavailable, certainly in the Northeastern United States, if such a facility is possible for him, so that he will have access to his family, his family to him. And, yes, he will be permitted to self-surrender.

MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

On September 5th? Can we just note that date?

THE COURT: Is that a good date, Mr. O'Neill?

MR. BRAFMAN: He would surrender to Canaan. He wouldn't surrender here.

THE COURT: Well, he has to be designated. We need at least 90 days for BOP, and they've been slow recently.

MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, let me make a suggestion, because in a couple of cases that we've just had, they've actually designated in six weeks. So if he's not designated --

THE COURT: You must have a magic wand, Mr. Brafman.

MR. BRAFMAN: No, no. It just happened recently in a case before Judge Furman. We got the designation.

THE COURT: Look, I'm happy to make it September the 5th. And the institution, Mr. Issa, will be told to Mr. Brafman, and you'll surrender there by 2 o'clock on that date. But we may have to push it back -- just know that we may have to push it back if we don't get a designation.

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

If he hasn't been designated by the end of August, we'll let Mr. O'Neill know and ask for additional time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Issa, much of what I say at sentencing ends up focusing on the period after incarceration, and it has to do with the period when you will be on supervised release for three years after you're released. You'll be under the supervision of the United States Probation Officer. And during that period, you have to do everything that the probation officer tells you to do; and you may not do anything that the probation officer tells you that you cannot do.

You'll report within 72 hours of your release.

And let me briefly run through the conditions of supervision.

You can't commit another crime. You cannot unlawfully possess a controlled substance. You have to participate in an outpatient treatment program approved by the United States Probation Office, which program will include testing to determine whether you've reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol. You must contribute to the cost of services rendered based on your ability to pay or the availability of third-party payment.

You must cooperate with the collection of DNA, genetic identifying material, as directed by your probation officer.

You must comply with all of the standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court, which I will go through briefly.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you're authorized to reside, which I believe is the Southern District of New York?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Without getting permission from the Court or the probation officer. You have to answer truthfully any questions put by your probation officer. You must live and you must work at least 30 hours a week at a lawful type of employment, both in locations approved by your probation officer and if you are going to change anything about where you live or who you live with or where you work or what you're

doing, you have to get the permission of the probation officer in advance, ten days in advance, unless there's an emergency. There's a fire, you have to vacate your house; and if that happens, you have 72 hours to notify your probation officer.

You have to allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere; and you permit the probation officer to take any items that are prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that are observed in plain view.

You must not communicate or interact with someone who you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone who has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify probation within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon. You must not act or make any agreement with law enforcement to act as a confidential human source or an informant without getting the permission of the Court.

You have to, as a special condition, provide the probation officer with access to your financial information; and you must not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless you are in compliance with the installment payment

schedule for your restitution.

Now, as for the restitution, the government will be submitting an order of restitution some time in the next 90 days. If while you're incarcerated you're engaged in what's called a non-UNICOR work program at the Bureau of Prisons, you have to pay \$25 per calendar quarter toward that restitution, and your \$700 in court costs. But the court costs are due and payable immediately; they need to be paid. \$25 per calendar quarter toward the criminal financial penalty of restitution.

If you're in a UNICOR Grade 1 through 4 program, you'll pay 50 percent of your monthly UNICOR earnings toward the restitution and, when you get out, 15 percent of your gross, pre-tax -- and you will be paying your taxes -- monthly income will go toward your restitution. You make your restitution payable to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for distribution to the U.S. Treasury.

Ibrahim Issa, you have the right to take an appeal of the jury's verdict and from the judgment and sentence that had been imposed upon you. You have a right to counsel in connection with any appeal you would choose to file. And if you elect to file a notice of appeal and you do not have the funds to retain counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent you without charge. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman, I assume you'll be filing a 1 2 notice of appeal on behalf of your client? 3 MR. BRAFMAN: We'll certainly make that decision within the statutory time period. Thank you, your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Brafman. 6 Is there anything else that I need to address today 7 from the government? 8 MS. HANFT: The government moves to dismiss the 9 underlying indictment in this case, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Underlying indictments are dismissed. Mr. Brafman, anything from you? 11 12 MR. BRAFMAN: Nothing, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Thank you all very much. 14 These proceedings are closed. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25